Battle of Tangtou-Guocun Part of the Chinese Civil War | Date| December 21, 1945 – December 30, 1945 | Location| Kiangsu, China Result| Communist victory Belligerents National Revolutionary Army New Fourth Army Commanders and leaders unknown| unknown Strength 4,000| 20,000 Casualties and losses 4,000| Several hundred * v * t * e Chinese Civil War Uprisings * Autumn Harvest * Baise * Guangzhou * Nanchang * Ningdu Encirclement campaigns * First * Jiangxi * Hubei–Henan–Anhui * Honghu * Hubei–Henan–Shaanxi * Shaanxi–Gansu * Second * Jiangxi * Hubei–Henan–Anhui * Honghu * Hubei–Henan–Shaanxi * Shaanxi–Gansu * Third * Jiangxi * Hubei–Henan–Anhui * Honghu * Hubei–Henan–Shaanxi * Shaanxi–Gansu * Fourth * Jiangxi * Hubei–Henan–Anhui * Hunan–Western Hubei * Fifth * Jiangxi * Hubei–Henan–Anhui * Kumul Rebellion * 1st Ürümqi * Toksun * 2nd Ürümqi * Kashgar Long March * Luding Bridge Soviet intervention * Manchouli * Soviet invasion of Xinjiang * Tutung * Dawan Cheng * Southern Xinjiang Intermission * Wannan * Ili * Yetaishan Resumption of hostilities * Opening Campaign * Southern Jiangsu * Baoying * Yongjiazhen * Tianmen * Linyi * Wuhe * Yinji * Huaiyin–Huai'an * Xinghua * Dazhongji * Lingbi * Zhucheng * Lishi * Pingdu * Taixing * Shangdang * Wuli * Xiangshuikou * Rugao * Weiguangnuan * Shicun * Operation Beleaguer * Houmajia * Handan * Pacification of Northeast China * Shaobo * Gaoyou * Tangguo * Houma * 1st Siping * 2nd Siping * North China Plain * Southern Tongpu Railway * Datong Jining * Longhai * Dapu * Ruhuang * Dingtao * Linfu * Zhengtai * Datong–Puzhou * Huaiyin–Huai'an * Yan'an * Kalgan * Lüliang * Linjiang * Guanzhong * Beitashan * South of Baoding * Niangziguan * Tang'erli * Menglianggu * Summer 1947, Northeast China * Heshui * 3rd Siping * North of Baoding * Nanlin * Meridian Ridge * North of Daqing River * Autumn 1947, Northeast China * Mt. Funiu * Winter 1947, Northeast China * Gongzhutun * Phoenix Peak * Western Tai'an * Jingzhong * Linfen * Zhouzhang * Hebei–Rehe–Chahar * Yanzhou * Shangcai * Liaoshen * Changchun * Jinzhou * Tashan * Jinan * Taiyuan * Huaihai * Shuangduiji * Jiulianshan * Pingjin * Tianjin * Yangtze River Bandits suppression * Northern China * Central and Southern China * Eastern China * Dabieshan * Northwestern China * Wupin * Southwestern China * Longquan * Northern Canton * Northeastern Guizhou * Hunan–Hubei–Sichuan * Western Hunan * Shiwandashan * Liuwandashan * Western Guangxi * Shanghai * Lanzhou * Ningxia * Nanchuan * Guangxi * Bobai * Chengdu * Bamianshan * Tianquan * Yiwu * KMT insurgency, 1950–1958 * China–Burma border * Kuomintang in Burma Island campaigns * Quemoy * Denbu * Nan'ao * Hainan Island * Dongshan * Wanshan * Nanpeng * Nanri * Nanpeng * Dalushan * Dongshan * Yijiangshan * Dachen * Dong-Yin The Battle of Tangtou–Guocun (塘头郭村战斗) was a series of clashes between the nationalists and the communists during the Chinese Civil War in the immediate post-World War II era in Kiangsu (Jiangsu) and resulted in the communist victory. ## Contents * 1 Prelude * 2 Nationalist Strategy * 3 Communist Strategy * 4 The battle * 5 Outcome * 6 See also * 7 References ## Prelude[edit] Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the nationalists in China, this conflict also rooted from the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had realized that his nationalist regime simply had neither the sufficient troops nor enough transportation assets to deploy his troops into the Japanese-occupied regions of China. Unwilling to let the communists who had already dominated most of the rural regions in China to further expand their territories by accepting the Japanese surrender and thus would consequently control the Japanese occupied regions, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Japanese and their turncoat Chinese puppet regime not to surrender to the communists and kept their fighting capabilities to “maintain order” in the Japanese occupied regions, fighting off the communists as necessary, until the final arrivals and completion of the deployment of the nationalist troops. As a result, most members of the Japanese puppet regimes and their military forces rejoined the nationalists. However, most of these former nationalists turned Japanese puppet regime forces were not from Chiang Kai-shek’s own clique, but instead, they were mainly consisted of troops of warlords who were only nominally under the Chiang Kai-shek’s before World War II, since they were nationalists in name only and mostly maintained their independent and semi-independent status. These warlords were only interested in keeping their own power and defected to the Japanese side when Japanese invaders offered to let them keep their power in exchange for their collaborations. After World War II, these forces of former Japanese puppet regimes once again returned to the nationalist camp for the same reason they defected to the Japanese invaders. Obviously, it was difficult for Chiang to immediately get rid of these warlords for good as soon as they surrendered to Chiang and rejoined nationalists, because such move would alienate other factions within the nationalist ranks, and these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords could still help the nationalists to gain more territories by holding on to what was under their control until Chiang completed the deployment of his own troops to take over. Chiang Kai-shek’s objective was to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, which proved to be an extremely fatal mistake for him and his nationalist regime later on, as shown in this conflict. ## Nationalist Strategy[edit] In accordance with his strategy to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together, Chiang Kai-shek and his followers had hoped that these former Japanese puppet regime's warlords who rejoined the nationalists would be able to hold on to the regions long enough for Chiang to deploy his own troops by holding off communists. If the communists were victorious in such conflicts, however, the result would still benefit to Chiang and China because the power of these warlords would be reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, and the warlord problem plagued China for so long could thus be greatly reduced, while at the same time, communists would be weakened by the fights and Chiang's own troops would have easier time to take control. For the former nationalist turned Japanese puppet regime forces, these warlords and their troops had no problem of following Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, and they were eager to prove themselves. These warlords and their troops were well aware that due to the collaboration with the Japanese invaders during the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were well hated by the general population in China, including those nationalists who refused to surrender to the enemy and fought the enemy until the eventual victory. Therefore, in the impending demilitarization after World War II, they were certainly be disarmed and discharged, which would probably be the best outcome and the power of these warlord would be reduced or even completely eliminated as a result. Chiang Kai-shek’s ordering them not surrendering to the communists and fighting off the communists was a savior for them because by carrying out such orders, these warlords and their troops could legitimize themselves and thus retain their power by fighting the communists who were targeted as rebels by Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime. ## Communist Strategy[edit] The communist strategy was much simpler than that of the nationalists because there was not any huge division within the communist rank like that of the nationalist. The communists already earned considerable popular support by being the only Chinese force left in the region fighting the Japanese invaders and their puppet regime after the nationalist withdrew, and after successfully establishing communist bases in the rural regions where better life was provided to the general populace in comparison to that of Japanese occupied regions, the general Chinese populace agreed that the communists were well deserved to represent the China to accept the invaders’ surrender in the region and takeover the regions occupied by the invaders. ## The battle[edit] After those former nationalist-turned Japanese puppet regime force had rejoined the nationalists after the end of World War II, they refused to surrender to the communists, the only Chinese force in the region according to Chiang Kai-shek’s order. This had obvious lead to numerous clashes with the communists and the local population that strongly supported the communists, and eventually the full scale battle between the two sides erupted in December 1945. The communist 7th Column of the New Fourth Army and the Independent Brigade of the communist Central Jiangsu Military District joined their forces in attacking the positions held by the former nationalist-turned Japanese puppet regime force who rejoined the nationalist, and with strong popular support, the communists easily overwhelmed their nationalist adversary and by the time the battle concluded in the end of December 1945, over sixteen major cities, towns and vast area along the highway from Yangzhou to Taizhou, Jiangsu including Yiling (宜陵), Embankment Head (Tangtou, 塘头) and the Village of Guo (Guocun, 郭村) had fallen into communist hands. ## Outcome[edit] Like other similar clashes immediately after the end of World War II between the communists and the nationalists in China, this conflict also showed that Chiang Kai-shek’s attempt to simultaneously solve the warlord problem that had plagued China for so long and the problem of the extermination of communism together proved to be a fatal mistake. Although the result of the campaign turned out exactly like Chiang Kai-shek and his subordinates had predicted, and consequently the power of the warlords in this region was indeed reduced as their military forces were smashed by the communists, so that the warlord problem plagued China for so long was thus reduced for this particular region, and Chiang Kai-shek’s secondary objective was achieved here, any positive gains obtained by the nationalists were negated by the politic fallout. The reason was that this success of achieving the secondary objective came at a huge cost in nationalists’ loss of popular support in this region formerly dominated by the Japanese, because the local population had already blamed nationalists for losing the regions to the Japanese invaders, while reassigning these former Japanese puppet regime forces as the nationalist forces to fight the communists, the only Chinese force left in the regions, only further alienated the local populace and strengthened the popular resentment to Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist regime. ## See also[edit] * List of battles of the Chinese Civil War * National Revolutionary Army * History of the People's Liberation Army * Chinese Civil War * v * t * e Chinese Civil War Principal belligerents and campaigns Nationalist Party / National Government ( National Revolutionary Army) → Constitutional ROC Government (ROC Armed Forces) → Republic of China on Taiwan * * * Communist Party / Soviet Republic ( Red Army) → Liberated Area ( 8th Route Army, N4A, etc. → People's Liberation Army) → People's Republic of China | Pre-1945| Post-1945| Current issues | | | 1923| Sun–Joffe Manifesto | 1924| First United Front 1926| Canton Coup 1927| Nanking incident Shanghai Commune Shanghai massacre Nanjing–Wuhan split 715 Incident Nanchang uprising Autumn Harvest Uprising Guangzhou Uprising 1929| Sino-Soviet conflict 1930–1934| Encirclement campaigns 1931–1934| Chinese Soviet Republic 1933–1934| Fujian People's Government 1934–1936| Long March 1936| Xi'an Incident 1937–1946| Second United Front (Wartime perception of the Chinese Communists) 1944| Dixie Mission | 1945| Chongqing Negotiations Double Tenth Agreement | 1946| Jiaochangkou Incident 1945-1947| Marshall Mission 1945–1949| Operation Beleaguer 1946–1949| Revolution 1947| Yu Tse-san Incident 1948| SS Kiangya incident Liaoshen campaign 1948–1949| Huaihai campaign Pingjin campaign 1949| Taiping Steamer Incident Yangtze River Crossing Campaign Amethyst Incident ROC Government retreat to Taiwan PRC incorporation of Xinjiang 1950–1958| Kuomintang Islamic insurgency 1950| Hainan Island campaign Wanshan Archipelago Campaign Battle of Chamdo (PRC annexation of Tibet) 1954| Capture of the Tuapse 1955| First Taiwan Strait Crisis 1958| Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (Kinmen Crisis) 1960–1961| China–Burma border 1987| Lieyu massacre 1996| Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 2005–present| Pan–Blue visits * Chinese unification * Cross-Strait relations * Political status of Taiwan * Taiwan independence movement * 2022 Chinese military exercises around Taiwan ## References[edit] This article includes a list of references, related reading or external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (September 2014) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) | * Zhu, Zongzhen and Wang, Chaoguang, Liberation War History, 1st Edition, Social Scientific Literary Publishing House in Beijing, 2000, ISBN 7-80149-207-2 (set) * Zhang, Ping, History of the Liberation War, 1st Edition, Chinese Youth Publishing House in Beijing, 1987, ISBN 7-5006-0081-X (pbk.) * Jie, Lifu, Records of the Liberation War: The Decisive Battle of Two Kinds of Fates, 1st Edition, Hebei People's Publishing House in Shijiazhuang, 1990, ISBN 7-202-00733-9 (set) * Literary and Historical Research Committee of the Anhui Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Liberation War, 1st Edition, Anhui People's Publishing House in Hefei, 1987, ISBN 7-212-00007-8 * Li, Zuomin, Heroic Division and Iron Horse: Records of the Liberation War, 1st Edition, Chinese Communist Party History Publishing House in Beijing, 2004, ISBN 7-80199-029-3 * Wang, Xingsheng, and Zhang, Jingshan, Chinese Liberation War, 1st Edition, People's Liberation Army Literature and Art Publishing House in Beijing, 2001, ISBN 7-5033-1351-X (set) * Huang, Youlan, History of the Chinese People's Liberation War, 1st Edition, Archives Publishing House in Beijing, 1992, ISBN 7-80019-338-1 * Liu Wusheng, From Yan'an to Beijing: A Collection of Military Records and Research Publications of Important Campaigns in the Liberation War, 1st Edition, Central Literary Publishing House in Beijing, 1993, ISBN 7-5073-0074-9 * Tang, Yilu and Bi, Jianzhong, History of Chinese People's Liberation Army in Chinese Liberation War, 1st Edition, Military Scientific Publishing House in Beijing, 1993 - 1997, ISBN 7-80021-719-1 (Volum 1), 7800219615 (Volum 2), 7800219631 (Volum 3), 7801370937 (Volum 4), and 7801370953 (Volum 5) *[v]: View this template *[t]: Discuss this template *[e]: Edit this template